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Hawaii DOT Must Prepare an
EA for Superferry
Sierra Club v. DOT, 167 P.3d 292 (Haw. 2007).
Sarah Spigener, 3L, University of Mississippi School
of Law
The Supreme Court of Hawaii has concluded
that the Hawaii Department of Transportation
(DOT) must prepare an environmental assessment (EA) for the Hawaii Superferry project.
Background
The Hawaii Superferry project is an inter-island
ferry service between the islands of O’ahu, Maui,
Kaua’i, and Hawai’i that utilizes harbor facilities
on each island. Hawaii Superferry, Inc. proposed
to develop and operate the service, which would
include two ferries capable of carrying up to 866
passengers and 282 cars per trip. The state and
Hawaii Superferry negotiated the details of the
project and DOT concluded that several improvements to Kahului Harbor were necessary to
accommodate the project. These improvements
included the construction of a removable barge
configured with a removable ramp, operational
support with utility services, security fencing,
pavement striping, the placement of boarding
gangway ramps, and installation of tents at
inspection points or customer waiting areas.
DOT prepared a draft EA, but did not reference the needed improvements. DOT later determined that the property “will have minimal or
no significant effect on the environment and is
therefore exempt from the preparation of an
EA.”1 The plaintiffs, environmental organizations Sierra Club, Maui Tomorrow, and the
Kahului Harbor Coalition, challenged DOT’s

determination that the improvements to the harbor were exempt from the requirements of the
Hawaii Environmental Protection Act (HEPA)
and the preparation of an EA. DOT and
Superferry filed a motion to dismiss or alternatively for summary judgment. The circuit court
ruled that the plaintiffs lacked standing and
ruled in favor of DOT and Superferry. The plaintiffs appealed these holdings to the Supreme
Court of Hawaii.
Agency Analysis
HEPA requires that EAs and environmental
impact statements (EIS) be prepared for certain
development projects. The law also assures the
public the right to participate in planning projects that may affect the community. Compliance
with HEPA involves several steps. First, it must
be determined whether a project or program is
subject to the environmental review process. If
the project is exempt, then the process stagnates.
The Environmental Council determines the procedures for certain actions that will probably
have “minimal or no significant effects on the
environment” and that will be declared exempt
from the preparation of an assessment.2 When no
exemption applies and the project is subject to
environmental review, then a draft EA must be
prepared.
An EA is an informational document prepared by the agency proposing the action to evaluate the possible environmental effects of a proposed action. Once completed, the public has
thirty days to review and comment on the EA.
After this, the agency reviews the final EA to
determine if any “significant” environmental
Superferry, page 2
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impacts are likely. If not, the agency issues a
finding of no significant impact (FONSI), which
allows the project to proceed. If so, the agency
must prepare a more detailed EIS. The public
process is repeated and the governor or mayor,
depending on the agency, must approve the final
EIS. After this, the action may be implemented.
HEPA provides for judicial review when no EA
is prepared, when an agency determines that an
EIS will or will not be required, and when an EIS
is accepted.
The court must determine whether the
agency’s factual determinations were clearly
erroneous and whether it otherwise complied
with HEPA and its implementing regulations, as
a matter of law. Likewise, exemption determinations should be reviewed as a matter of law.
The organizations contended that they had
standing in this case based on two grounds: traditional injury in fact and procedural standing.
The court found that the plaintiff could sue on
either basis. Standing is a determination of
whether the parties have the right to bring suit.
The court utilized a three-part standing test: 1)
has the plaintiff suffered an actual or threatened
injury; 2) is the injury fairly traceable to the
defendant’s actions; and 3) would a favorable
decision likely provide relief for plaintiff ’s
injury. The test has been relaxed for environmental cases. The plaintiff must prove 1) injury
in fact; 2) economic harm including aesthetic
and environmental well-being as interests deserving of protection; and 3) an individual’s
injury is not much different from that of a public injury. The “procedural standing doctrine is a
means of accommodating the standing inquiry to
special circumstances created by injuries to
statutory procedural rights.”3
The court concluded that there is procedural
standing for members of the public under HEPA
because it is a procedural statute that accords
procedural rights. The court held that the threatened injury in fact was due to DOT’s decision to
bypass conducting an EA and that the procedural injury was due to violations of their procedural rights under HEPA. The appellants also
demonstrated that the injuries were caused by
Volume 6, No. 4 The SandBar

DOT and Superferry and that they may be nation that the improvements to Kahului Harbor
addressed by the court.
were exempt from the requirements of HEPA
DOT and Superferry also contested whether were erroneous as a matter of law. The court
the organizations had standing to bring a claim vacated the circuit court’s judgment, entered a
against them on behalf of individual members. summary judgment on behalf of the appellants,
The court stated that an organization may sue on ordered DOT to conduct an EA before the project
behalf of its members when 1) its members could proceed, and remanded on other issues.
would otherwise have standing to sue on their
own; 2) the interests it seeks to protect are ger- Conclusion
mane to the organization’s purpose; and 3) nei- The court held that the appellant organizations
ther the claim asserted nor the relief requested had standing to sue based on traditional standing
requires the participation
and procedural standof individual members in
ing tests. The court also
the lawsuit. The parties
held that the appellants
contested the last requirehad organizational standment. Normally, individing to sue on behalf of
ual participation is required
their individual memwhere the plaintiffs rebers. The court agreed
quest money damages or
with the appellants that
where there are conflicts
DOT had erroneously
of interests between memdeclared the Hawaii
bers. Since neither of those
Superferry project an
situations applies in this
exempt action thereby
case, the court concluded
exempting it from
that the organizations had
HEPA requirements.
standing to file suit on
The court entered judgPhotograph of Hawaii courtesy of ©Nova Development Corp.
behalf of its members.
ment on behalf of the
Having established standing, the appel- appellants and ordered DOT to conduct an EA
lants argued that DOT’s exemption determina- on the entire Superferry project before it could
tions were in violation of the law for several rea- continue operating and the necessary improvesons. The court characterized the issue as ments could be made.
“whether DOT was correct to analyze only the
Since the Supreme Court of Hawaii entered
harbor improvements in making its exemption this judgment in favor of the appellants, the
determination, or was also required to consider Hawaii legislature has approved a bill allowing
the potential environmental impacts caused by the Hawaii Superferry to resume operation. The
the Hawaii Superferry project.”4 The court stated new legislation, supported by Governor Linda
that an agency must first determine whether the Lingle, allows the ferry to make its Oahu-toproject meets the definition of exempt action Maui and Oahu-to-Kauai voyages while the enviwhich is a minor project that will probably have ronmental assessment is being conducted.5
minimal or no significant effects on the environment. The court concluded that the Superferry Endnotes
project was not such an action because DOT’s 1. Sierra Club v. DOT, 167 P.3d 292, 310 (Haw.
2007).
exemption determination did not consider the
secondary impacts that could result from the use 2. Id. at 300.
of the Superferry on the Kahului Harbor or 3. Id. at 318.
whether the Superferry operations would have 4. Id. at 329.
any significant effects on the environment. As a 5. Christopher Pala, Legislature Clears Way for
Hawaii Ferry, N.Y. Times, Oct. 31, 2007.
result, the court concluded that DOT’s determiVolume 6, No. 4 The SandBar
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Court Grants Stay of Injunction
in Navy Sonar Case
Natural Resources Defense Council v. Winter , 2007
WL 3377229 (9th Cir. Nov. 13, 2007).
Alicia Schaffer, 2L, Roger Williams University
School of Law
The views expressed herein are those of the author
and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Sea
Grant Law Center, NOAA, or any of its sub agencies.
Since the 1960s, marine mammal stranding
events have been documented. There has been
evidence that these events have been linked to
underwater sonar testing. The first major stranding event to be recorded was in the Bahamas in
March 2000. This event coincided with the
Navy’s use of mid-frequency sonar in the area at
the time. 1 Even more recently, thirty-seven
whales were stranded off the coast of North
Carolina where Naval use of sonar was identified
as the probable cause.2
The National Resources Defense Council
(NRDC), bolstered by its success in a previous
suit against the Navy’s use of low-frequency
sonar, recently filed suit against the Navy once
again for its use of mid-frequency sonar.3 The
ensuing battle between the Navy and the NRDC
is based on the Navy’s plan to use mid-frequency
sonar in fourteen large-scale training exercises
off the coast of Southern California between
February 2007 and January 2009.4 The Navy’s
Environmental Assessment states that the exercises will result in an estimated 170,000 “takes,”
which can include the harassment, harm, and
killing of these creatures.5
In this case, the NRDC filed for an injunction to prohibit the Navy’s use of sonar. In
August 2007, the U.S. District Court for the
Central District of California granted an injunction; however, less than a month later, the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed this decision
and stayed the injunction. In November 2007,
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, upon hearPage 4

ing the case, reinstated the blanket injunction on
sonar testing until the Navy adheres to the mitigating factors prescribed by the district court. As
a result, marine mammals have been spared from
the full exposure of the Navy’s sonar use.
Background
Navy sonar, though not the only cause of noise
pollution in the water, is a major one. Mid-frequency sonar is emitted into the water column at
a pressure of 235+ decibels for about 0.5 – 2 seconds repeated every 28 seconds.6 The Navy’s
Environmental Assessment defines its use of
Photograph of sonar equipment courtesy of the U.S. Navy.
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mid-frequency sonar as “Level B” harassment
which means that the marine mammals will be
“subjected to sound levels of between 170 and
195 decibels.”7 However, the intensity of Level B
harassment is difficult to predict given the only
comparative test at levels of 235 decibels and
greater. The Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (OSHA) requires hearing protection to be used where workers are exposed to
sounds at “90dB for eight hours or 110dB for as
little as thirty minutes.”8 Given that the sound of
a rocket taking off is 235 decibels, it is not unreasonable to assume that the use of mid-frequency
sonar is potentially disruptive to marine mammals’ health and way of life.9
Scientists have been looking for a definite
link between strandings and sonar. One group of
scientists, for example, cited a correlation
between low-frequency sonar testing and one
major stranding event.10 These mass-stranding
events are just one of the many alleged effects
that sonar has had on marine mammals, others
include: embolisms, gross damage to the auditory system, hearing loss, interruption in feeding,
breeding and nursing, displacement from habitat, and degradation of habitat.11 Prior to the
NRDC litigation, the Navy had been employing
mitigation measures to prevent such effects;
however, it recently eliminated many of these
practices. The district court references the abandonment of such measures as “power-downs” in
conditions where sound travels greater distances,
within the “twelve nautical mile coastal buffer
zone,” and “protection measures” during checkpoint exercises.12
The Ninth Circuit’s Decisions
In August 2007, the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals took a look at the balance of harms
between the two parties when deciding whether
to sustain the lower court’s injunction in favor of
the NRDC. The court concluded that the district
court did not properly balance the harms because
it failed to give proper consideration to the public interest.13 The Ninth Circuit suggested that
national defense could be a higher priority than
the safety of whales. Specifically, the court stated
“[t]he public does indeed have a very considerable

interest in preserving our natural environment
and especially relatively scarce whales. But it also
has an interest in national defense…The safety of
the whales must be weighed, and so much the
safety of our warriors. And of our country.”14
Furthermore, the court stated that this is an
issue where deference should be given, because it
is a matter of national security.15 The majority
sided with the Navy based on the premise that
there is no other feasible place that this testing
could be done, because there is nothing on the
record that would suggest a feasible alternative at
this time.16 However, both the majority and the
dissent urged the expedient resolution to this
case in order to “eliminate a great deal of risk to
both our country and to marine wildlife.”17 This
goal of eliminating risk to national security and
wildlife was evident when the Ninth Circuit
handed down its decision on November 13, 2007.
The decision enjoins the Navy from continuing
with its training exercises unless it adheres to the
mitigation measures ordered by the district
court. However, if the district court fails to order
these measures the stay of the injunction can
become effective once again.18
Conclusion
The issue can be reduced simply: national security versus the environment. The U.S. Navy touts
its commitment to “maintaining the balance
between defending freedom and remaining good
stewards of the environment” but is resistant to
implementing measures that would significantly
mitigate the harm caused by its actions.19 The
courts are tacitly allowing the Navy to fulfill its
role as both steward and defender. The Navy has
spent millions of dollars in research on this issue
and can point to measures taken to help the animals; hopefully, this, in addition to the courtimposed mitigation measures, means that
marine mammals will not suffer the consequences when testing resumes.
Looking to the future, there is a prospect of
more litigation if the Navy does not use mitigation measures. The Navy has set its sights on a
testing ground near the coast of North Carolina,
already the site of a stranding event of thirtyseven whales linked to Naval activity. Suspicion
See Sonar, page 6
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Sonar, from page 5

arose because of the proximity of the stranding,
both spatially and temporally, to the naval testing and the absence of other factors that could
have caused it.20 Hopefully the Navy will learn
from the past two lawsuits and implement mitigation measures that are applicable to this area
from the start instead of burdening the courts
with yet another suit.
Update
On remand, the United States District Court for
the Central District of California issued an order
limiting the Navy’s sonar training exercises off
the coast of Southern California. The order limits
the use of medium-range sonar to an area beyond
12 nautical miles from shore and requires monitoring to detect the presence of marine mammals
before and during the exercises.
Endnotes
1. Jasny, Michael, et al. Sounding the Depths II:
The Rising Toll of Sonar, Shipping and
Industrial Ocean Noise on Marine Life.
Natural Resources Defense Council. Nov.
2005. http://www.nrdc.org/wildlife/ marine/
sound/ sound.pdf . pg. 8-9.
2. NRDC Press Release: Government Report on
Mass Whale Stranding in N.C. Identifies
Naval Sonar as Possible Cause. March 29,

2006. http://www.nrdc.org/media/pressreleases/060329a.asp .
3. NRDC: Protecting Whales from Dangerous
Sonar.
www.nrdc.org/wildlife/marine/sonar.asp .
4. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v.
Winter. Unreported in F.Supp.2d, at 1. 2007
WL 2481037 (C.D.Cal., August 7, 2007).
5. Id.
6. Jasny, supra note 1, pg. 3.
7. NRDC, 2007 WL 2481037 at *1.
8. Id.
9. Ocean Noise Affects Marine Life, ENVIRONMENT, 44 (5):4 (2002).
10. A. Frantzis, Does Acoustic Testing Strand
Whales? NATURE, 392, (6671):29 (1998).
11. Jasny, supra note 1, pg. 7.
12. NRDC, 2007 WL 2481037.
13. Natural Resources Defense Council v. Winter.
502 F.3d 859, 863 (9th Cir. Aug. 31, 2007).
14. Id. at 863-864.
15. Id. at 862.
16. Id. at 864.
17. Id. at 865.
18. Natural Resources Defense Council v. Winter. 2007
WL 3377229 at *4-5 (9th Cir. Nov. 13, 2007).
19. U.S. Navy Website: Whales and Sonar.
http://www.whalesandsonar.navy.mil/index.htm .
20. NRDC Press Release, supra note 2.
Photograph of whale fluke courtesy of NOAA.
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Eleventh Circuit Uses
“Significant Nexus” Test
United States v. Robison, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS
24825 (11th Cir. Oct. 24, 2007).
Terra Bowling, J.D.
The Eleventh Circuit vacated a district court’s
conviction of a company and several members of
management for conspiracy to violate and violations of the Clean Water Act (CWA). The court
held that in light of the Supreme Court’s recent
decision in Rapanos the district court’s jury
instructions on “navigable waters” was inaccurate and erroneous.
Background
McWane is a manufacturer of cast iron pipe,
flanges, valves, and fire hydrants. At its plant in
Birmingham, Alabama, the company discharges
wastewater into Avondale Creek. The CWA generally prohibits the discharge of pollutants into
navigable
waters. However, the CWA
authorizes
either the EPA
or states approved by the
EPA to issue
permits for
Photograph of industrial water discharge from
the discharge
©Nova Development Corp.
of pollutants
pursuant to a National Pollutant Discharge
Elimination System (NPDES).
McWane had an NPDES permit issued by the
Alabama Department of Environmental Management (ADEM) that allowed the company to
discharge some treated wastewater from one discharge point at the plant, as long as it met certain
requirements. However, evidence showed that
the company discharged wastewater into the

creek from several unauthorized discharge
points. The permit also allowed the discharge of
stormwater runoff from specified stormwater
discharge points. Polluted wastewater was
spilling into stormwater run off points and flowing into Avondale Creek.
The company and several of the company’s
employees were indicted, including several
managers - James Delk, Michael Devine, and
Charles Robison - and Donald Bills, the plant
engineer. At trial, several McWane employees
offered evidence of the violations. The district
court dismissed Bills from the case, and the
rest were convicted of various offenses.
McWane, Delk, and Devine appealed their
convictions.
Navigable Waters
On appeal, McWane, Delk, and Devine (appellants) argued that Avondale Creek did not meet
the definition of “navigable waterway” under the
CWA and, therefore, they did not violate the
CWA. The Eleventh Circuit noted that the
Supreme Court had interpreted the term “navigable waters” in Rapanos while this appeal was
pending; therefore, the court looked at whether
the district court used the correct definition of
navigable waterways.
The Rapanos decision, a plurality decision,
did not provide a clear test for lower courts to use
when determining whether a body of water is a
“navigable waterway.” Justice Scalia’s opinion
would require navigable waters to be “relatively
permanent, standing or flowing bodies of water,”
and have a “continuous surface connection.”1
Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion would
require a “significant nexus” between a water or
wetland and another water that is or was navigable in fact or could reasonably be made so. The
circuit courts are split over which opinion to use.
The Seventh and Ninth Circuits have used
Kennedy’s opinion, while the First Circuit has
said that either test may be used.
See Nexus, page 8

Volume 6, No. 4 The SandBar

Page 7

Litigation Update
In re Katrina Canal Breaches Consolidated Litigation, 495 F.3d 191 (5th Cir. 2007).
Sarah Spigener, 3L, University of Mississippi School
of Law
On August 29th, 2005, before Hurricane Katrina
reached New Orleans, the levees of the 17th Street
Canal failed and caused water to inundate the area.
Several homeowners sued their insurance companies seeking compensation for the loss of their
property. The insurance companies objected and
claimed that the damage was excluded from their
policies. The Eastern District Court of Louisiana
ruled in favor of the homeowners and concluded
that without a specific definition included in an
exclusion in the policy, the term “flood” in many of
the policies was ambiguous. The court contemplated common dictionary definitions to determine that the term “flood” in some of the insurance policies referred to natural events and a “rising over,” an “overflowing,” or an “overtopping” of
water. The court concluded that the insurance
policies containing an ambiguous definition of
“flood” were therefore required to compensate the
homeowners according to their policies.

The Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals, however, disagreed with the court’s
decision. On appeal, the court concluded that
even if the plaintiffs could prove that the construction or maintenance of the levees caused the
damage to their property, the flood exclusions in
the homeowners’ policies unambiguously precluded their recovery. The court held that the
term “flood” included in the insurance policies
was unambiguous. The court also looked to dictionaries to determine that a “flood” is defined as
an “inundation of land.” The court also considered other court interpretations of similar insurance coverage as it related to the failure of structures such as dams or dikes. In these cases, the
courts uniformly held that the inundation of
water falls within the policy exclusions.
Additionally, the court noted that the levee is a
flood-control structure, designed to prevent
floods, which is what happened in this case. The
court also disagreed that a “flood” is limited to
natural events. The court vacated the judgment
of the district court and entered judgment in
favor of the defendant insurance policies.

Nexus, from page 7

In this instance, the appellants argued that
Kennedy’s “significant nexus” test should be
used, while the government argued that either
test could apply. The Eleventh Circuit looked
at the reasoning used by the circuit courts in
reaching their conclusion. Citing U.S. v. Gerke,
a Seventh Circuit case heard after the Rapanos
decision, the Eleventh Circuit noted that
“when a majority of the Supreme Court agrees
only on the result of a case, lower courts ‘are to
follow the narrowest ground to which a majority of the Justices would have assented if forced
to choose.’”2 The Gerke court believed that
Justice Kennedy’s test would be the narrowest
ground. Therefore, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that Kennedy’s significant nexus test
should be the governing definition of navigable waterway.
Page 8

Jury Instruction
In the district court, the jury did not mention the
phrase “significant nexus” in its “navigable
waters” instruction to the jury or instruct the
jury to consider the chemical, physical, or biological effect of Avondale Creek on the Black
Warrior River. The court held that because the
instruction did not include Justice Kennedy’s
“significant nexus” test, it was erroneous. The
court therefore vacated the district court’s judgment, reversed the convictions, and remanded
the case.
Endnotes
1. Rapanos v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 2208 at
2242-44 (U.S. 2006).
2. United States v. Robison, 2007 U.S. App.
LEXIS 24825 (11th Cir. Oct. 24, 2007).
Volume 6, No. 4 The SandBar

Alaska Upholds Commercial
Fishery Decision
Pasternak v. State of Alaska, Commercial Fisheries
Entry Commission, 2007 Alas. Lexis 107 (Alaska
Sept. 7, 2007).
Sara Wilkinson, 3L, University of Mississippi School
of Law
The Alaska Supreme Court has upheld the
decision of the Alaska Commercial Fisheries
Entry Commission (CFEC) regarding participation in non-distressed fisheries. The
Supreme Court specifically addressed a 1985
CFEC decision that limited Alaska’s Northern
Southeast Inside sablefish longline fishery to
seventy-three permits.
Background
The CFEC, under the authority of Alaska’s
Limited Entry Act, is charged with determining
both the optimum and the maximum number of
permits for a fishery and outlining the qualifications for the issuance of permits. The CFEC distributes permits based on a point system used to
determine an applicant’s order of priority, taking
into account past participation as a skipper or
crew member in the particular fishery, as well as
economic dependence on the fishery. Points for
permit priority may also be awarded based on
income dependence and vessel investment.
In 1985, the CFEC limited participation in
the Northern Southeast Inside sablefish longline
fishery over concern for the economic and environmental health of the fishery. The commission
limited the fishery to seventy-three permits to be
distributed on a points-based application system.
In determining the number of permits, the
CFEC was required to set a maximum number of
permits “no lower than the highest number of
units of gear in the fishery in the four years prior
to the January 1, 1985 qualification date.”1 Since
the fishery had seventy-three units of gear in one
of those years, the maximum number could be no
lower than seventy-three. Because the fishery was

considered non-distressed, the CFEC had the
authority to set the optimum number of available
permits at a number higher than seventy-three.2
After the issuance of a public notice, seventythree became the optimum and the maximum
number of permits available in May 2001.
In November 1987, Walter Pasternak submitted an application for a limited entry permit,
claiming fifty-one points based on past participation in the fishery, vessel ownership, and
income dependence. In April 1989, the CFEC
awarded Pasternak forty-three and one-half
points, reducing the vessel ownership points
because Pasternak’s wife jointly owned the vessel. Pasternak requested a hearing regarding the
points distributed for vessel ownership and in
March 1991 was issued a written decision awarding all fifteen vessel ownership points bringing
his point total to fifty-one points.
In January 2003, the CFEC denied
Pasternak’s application because fifty-one points
were insufficient to qualify him for a fishery permit. In February 2003, Pasternak filed petition
for reconsideration with the CFEC and, shortly
thereafter, an appeal in superior court alleging
that the CFEC set the maximum number of permits available for the fishery too low. Pasternak’s
case was stayed pending the court’s decision in a
similar case, Simpson v. State, Commercial
Fisheries Entry Commission.
Maximum Number of Permits
The court noted that in its review of an agency’s
interpretation of its own regulation, a reasonable
basis standard of review was appropriate. In
essence, the Alaska Supreme court will defer to
the agency’s expertise and decision unless its
“interpretation is plainly erroneous and inconsistent with the regulation.”3
Pasternak claimed that the CFEC erred in
setting the maximum number of permits at seventy-three and sought a ten-permit increase. In
discussing Pasternak’s claim, the court looked
See Fishery Decision, page 10
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primarily at Simpson, in which
are awarded based on a harvest
the plaintiff challenged both
of at least 2,000 pounds or a
the maximum and optimum
proof of some extraordinary
number of permits set for the
circumstance that prevented
fishery by the CFEC. The court
participation in the year in
rejected Simpson’s claim using
question. Pasternak did not para two-pronged test. The test
ticipate in the fishery in 1983,
first clarified that the maxirendering him ineligible for
mum number of permits should
participation points absent the
be set at a level that is no lower
showing of extraordinary cirthan the highest number of
cumstances that prevented his
units of gear in operation in any
participation.
one year for the four years prior
Pasternak explained that he
to the limitation on the fishery.
did not participate in the fishery
Second, the CFEC must meet Photograph of sablefish being measured courtesy in 1983 due to concerns over his
its primary goals of conserving of NOAA.
equipment and the advice of
the fishery while enabling fishother fishermen. The court
ermen to receive adequate compensation. The found that Pasternak’s explanation did not fall
court held that the CFEC met both requirements within the scope of extraordinary circumstances
and found in favor of the CFEC’s allotment of because he did not make all reasonably possible
seventy-three permits for the fishery.
efforts to participate in the fishery in 1983.
Relying on Simpson, the court rejected
Pasternak’s argument that the maximum number Conclusion
of permits should be increased for the fishery. The Alaska Supreme Court upheld the CFEC’s
Pasternak also argued in the alternative that the decision regarding the maximum and optimum
maximum number of permits should simply be number of permits for Alaska’s Northern
increased to seventy-four permits. However, the Southeast Inside sablefish longline fishery. In
court noted that there was no evidence to indicate addition, the court held that Pasternak was not
that if the maximum number was increased to sev- entitled to participation points for extraordienty-four Pasternak would be eligible for a permit. nary circumstances for 1983. In essence, the
court primarily relied on its past holding in
Optimum Number of Permits
Simpson, which upheld the CFEC’s decision for
In addition to challenging the maximum number the same fishery.
of permits, Pasternak challenged the CFEC’s
decision regarding the optimum number of per- Endnotes
mits for the fishery. In Simpson, the court upheld 1. Simpson v. State, Commercial Fisheries Entry
the CFEC’s decision to set the optimum number
Comm’n, 101 P.3d 605, 607 (Alaska 2004).
of permits at seventy-three. Pasternak asserted 2. The Alaska Supreme Court differentiated
that positive changes in the fishery justified an
between distressed and non-distressed fishincrease in the optimum number of permits set
eries in Johns v. Commercial Fisheries Entry
at seventy-three. The court rejected Pasternak’s
Commission, 758 P.2d 1256, 1262 n.6 (Alaska
1988). The court noted “a non-distressed fishargument based on the holding in Simpson and
evidence that the fishery was actually declining.
ery may tolerate more units of gear than the
historic high. In contrast, a distressed fishery,
Permitting Points Based on Past Participation
by definition, cannot…Second, a distressed
Pasternak’s final argument asserted that the
fishery is one which is overgeared as of
CFEC erred by refusing to consider his claim for
January 1, 1973.”
participation in 1983. Past participation points 3. Simpson, 101 P.3d 605.
Page 10
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NPDES Permit May Allow
Photography of Premises
Bowman Apple Products Co., Inc. v. State Water
Control Board, 2007 Va. App. LEXIS 345 (Sept.
18, 2007).
Margaret Enfinger, 2L, University of Alabama
School of Law
The Virginia Court of Appeals has found that
companies requesting permits to discharge into
state waters may have to allow inspectors to photograph their premises.
Background
Bowman Apple Products uses well water in bottling its products in Virginia. The company is
required to have a Virginia Pollutant Discharge
Elimination System (VDPES) permit issued by
the State Water Control Board to discharge
wastewater into a nearby river. The permit contains an “inspection and entry provision”
that allows an agent of the Virginia
Department of Environmental
Quality (VDEQ) to enter the property to ensure compliance with the
permit. During an inspection,
Bowman officials refused to let a
VDEQ agent take photographs.
When the time arrived for a new
permit, the State Water Control Board
added another requirement to the company’s permit: Bowman must allow photography during inspections. Bowman objected to
this new rule and sued under the Virginia
Administrative Process Act, claiming that the
agency’s implementation of the new requirement
was “arbitrary and capricious.” Specifically, the
company objected to the overbroad nature of the
new requirement, which would result in an automatic violation of the permit if the company had
any restrictions on photography, even restrictions
to protect the company’s proprietary interest. In
its complaint, the company also alleged that the
VDEQ did not follow the proper administrative
Volume 6, No. 4 The SandBar

procedures in instituting the requirement and
noted that the rule was not included on any other
permit in the state.
The circuit court held that the new requirement was reasonable, although the language of
the provision could result in different interpretations. The court remanded the case to the agency,
directing it to amend the permit’s special
requirement to only allow photography that was
reasonably related to the investigation.
Virginia Disagrees
On appeal, relying upon the EPA’s inspection
manual, the Virginia Court of Appeals reasoned
that photos are a reasonable part of a thorough
and accurate inspection report. They document
conditions and are evidence in enforcement proceedings. In fact, they are similar to the already
established permit requirement of allowing
access to and copying of records.
While this permit requirement of
allowing photography is unique in
Bowman’s permit, this does not automatically mean that it is impermissible. In fact, this special requirement became necessary for the
inspections because of Bowman’s continued refusal to permit photography.
Also, Bowman did not give up all privacy as the company could restrict photography that was not related to the investigation. The court of appeals subsequently upheld
the circuit court’s amended permit requirement.
Conclusion
The Supreme Court of Virginia has held that the
control of discharges into Virginia’s waters is
necessary for the common good. The court of
appeals seemed to think that photography is a
reasonable way for an agency to control and
enforce its discharge permits. In other words,
photography may be a necessary part of the
inspection process.
Page 11

Seaman Bound by
Employment Contract
Skowronek v. American Steamship Company, 2007
U.S. App. LEXIS 23926 (Oct. 12, 2007).
Terra Bowling, J.D.
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has found
that an injured seaman is bound by maintenance
rates in the collective bargaining agreement
(CBA) governing his employment.
Background
A maintenance fee is paid by ship owners to cover
the cost of food and lodging of ill or injured seamen
while they are unable to work. In September 2004,
Larry Skowronek was working aboard an American
Steamship Company vessel when he suffered a
heart attack. Skowronek remained out of service for
almost two months while he was recuperating. The
company paid Skowronek $56.00 per week as a
maintenance fee, in accordance with the CBA
between his union and his employer.
Skowronek filed suit, arguing that instead of
the $56.00 rate for ill crew members he should be
awarded the CBA’s $300 per-week rate for injured
crew members. The United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Michigan granted
Skowronek summary judgment.
Fair Deal
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit examined whether
the maintenance rate for ill crew members was
enforceable under the CBA, in light of the
injured crew member rate of $300 per week. The
court acknowledged that federal courts generally
enforce negotiated maintenance rates in a CBA,
even if the rates do not cover a crew member’s
daily food and lodging expenses.
In a previous case regarding negotiated maintenance rates, the Sixth Circuit held “when a
benefits package includes an express reference to
a precise rate of maintenance, it must be presumed that this rate was arrived at by negotiation.”1 The court concluded that these negotiated
rates are the “result of give and take collective
Page 12

bargaining between parties” and should be binding.2 Therefore, the court presumed that the rates
in Skowronek’s CBA were negotiated and binding and did not speculate whether $8.00 per day
was sufficient to provide Skowronek with food
and lodging.
The court held that when a maintenance rate
is negotiated, the plaintiff has the burden of
proving that the rates were not legitimately negotiated, that the agreement was unfair as a whole,
or that the union did not adequately represent
him. Skowronek did not present evidence to
prove any of these issues.
Conclusion
The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court’s
decision. The court found that the maintenance
rates were the result of the collective bargaining
between the parties and, therefore, should be
binding. The court also held that the plaintiff has
the burden of proving that the rates were not
legitimately negotiated, that the agreement was
unfair as a whole, or that the union did not adequately represent him.
One judge dissented, finding “the collective
bargaining agreement presently before the court
contains an unusual provision that discriminates
between ill and injured seamen. This provision is
inconsistent with the common law of admiralty,
and at odds with the reasons why courts originally developed and protected seaman’s right to
maintenance.”3
Endnotes
1. Al-Zawkari v. American S.S. Co., 871 F.2d 585,
588 (6th Cir. 1989).
2. Skowronek v. American Steamship Company,
2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 23926 at *9-10 (Oct.
12, 2007).
3. Id. at *20.
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Court Dismisses Seaman’s
MRSA Claim
Crawford v. Elec. Boat Corp., 2007 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 74385 (D. Conn. 2007).
Amber Myers Robinson, 3L, University of Mississippi
School of Law
In an admiralty suit filed by a seaman who
claimed to have contracted a staph infection
while working aboard a ship, the United States
District Court for the District of Connecticut
granted motions to dismiss in favor of defendants, the United States and Electric Boat. The
court granted defendant United States’ Rule
12(b)(1) motion to dismiss the Federal Torts
Claim Act (FTCA) claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and the United States’ and
Electric Boat’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss
an unseaworthiness claim, for failure to state a
claim upon which relief could be granted.

Vessels Act (PVA), the Jones Act, the Longshore
and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act
(LHWCA), and general maritime law. The plaintiffs also brought suit against both Electric Boats
and the United States, claiming that the United
States was already in control of the vessel; however, the court did not visit this question.

Motion to dismiss FTC claim
The United States moved to dismiss the FTCA
claim under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The United States claimed that
the FTCA claim should be dismissed, since the
SAA alone gives the court jurisdiction. Also, the
language of the FTCA provides that the act does
not apply to “any claim for which a remedy is provided by chapter 309 [the Suits in Admiralty Act]
or 311 [the Public Vessels Act] of title 46 relating
to claims or suits in admiralty against the United
States.”1 The plaintiffs argued that the FTCA
Background
claim should not be dismissed since it was only
Bruce Crawford, an engineer for Electric Boat, pled in the alternative; however, the court diswas assigned to take the vessel SSN-023 on a agreed, holding that if the plaintiffs’ suit was in
final sea trial before it was released as a Navy admiralty it could only be brought under an
Ship. Crawford alleged that while on the voyage, admiralty statute and not the FTCA. As a result
he contracted a serious infection known as of this holding, the court looked at the facts of the
Methylin Resistant Staph Aureus, due to case to determine if this was a suit that could be
the vessel’s unsanitary condition. The in- brought under an admiralty statute.
The court applied the
fection eventually spread to
“situs/status” test laid out in
Crawford’s family causing open
Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes
sores, disfiguring wounds, and
Dredge & Dock Co.2 to determine
pain. The Crawford family
whether there was admiralty
incurred the cost of medical
jurisdiction. The “situs/status”
care and disinfecting procetest requires (1) that the tort
dures to rid them of the infectook place on navigable waters
tion. Crawford and his family,
or was caused by a vessel on
including his wife and two
navigable waters and (2) that
minor children, filed suit.
the tort had a significant relaThe plaintiffs filed suit for
tionship to traditional marnegligence and unseaworthiitime activity. The court quickness under the Federal Torts
ly determined that Crawford’s
Claim Act (FTCA), Suits in
Scanning
electron
microscopy
of
Staphylococcus
satisfied the “situs” portion of
Admiralty Act (SAA), Public
courtesy of NIH.
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the test, since he was injured while he was aboard
a vessel that was at sea. However, the court had to
conduct a different analysis to determine if the
injuries to the other three plaintiffs fell within
admiralty jurisdiction.
Under the Extension of Admiralty Jurisdiction Act, “the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States extends to and
includes cases of injury or damage, to person or
property, caused by a vessel on navigable waters,
even though the injury or damage is done or consummated on land.”3 Therefore, if the other three
plaintiffs’ injuries were caused by a vessel on
navigable waters then their injuries would fall
under admiralty jurisdiction, regardless of the
fact that they came into contact with the infection on land.
The defendants argued that because the vessel was conducting a sea trial, it was not “in navigation.” The court, following the Stewart v.
Dutra4 analysis, determined that there is no separate “in navigation” requirement. All that is
required is that the vessel is used or is capable of
being used as maritime transportation. The court
noted that not only was the vessel capable of
being used for maritime transportation, that it
was actually being used as maritime transportation. Therefore, the court held that the other
three plaintiffs also satisfied the “situs” portion
of the test for admiralty tort jurisdiction.
Finally, the court applied the second portion
of the admiralty tort jurisdiction test, the “status” test. Under the “status” test there are two
issues: (1) the court looks at the incident and
determines whether it has a potential to disrupt
maritime commerce; and, (2) the court determines whether the nature of the activity giving
rise to the incident has a substantial relationship to traditional maritime activity. The court
found that all plaintiffs met the “status” element of the test. The court, using persuasive
case authority, determined that unsafe conditions occurring on a vessel under repair has a
potential to disrupt maritime commerce. The
court also determined that a naval sea operation
was considered traditional maritime activity,
therefore satisfying the second element of the
“status” test.
Page 14

Motion to dismiss for failure to state an unsea worthiness claim
The defendants, United States and Electric Boat,
argued that the plaintiffs failed to establish a
claim under maritime law for unseaworthiness.
The defendants argued that Crawford was not
given a warranty of seaworthiness since he was on
the voyage in order to test the vessel for seaworthiness. The defendants relied on two Fifth
Circuit cases5 that had established that there was
no warranty of seaworthiness for a vessel undergoing a sea trial. The plaintiffs argued that those
cases had been overruled by Stewart. However,
the court disagreed with the plaintiffs and found
that Stewart only overruled the “vessel in navigation” issue. The court held that a warranty of seaworthiness could not exist before the vessel had
completed the sea trial test that was being administered in order to make the vessel seaworthy.
Conclusion
The United States District Court for the District
of Connecticut granted the United States’ motion
to dismiss the FTCA claim, holding that the SAA
and PAV were mutually exclusive from the
FTCA and since the plaintiffs had an admiralty
cause of action that they would have to file suit
under an admiralty statute. The court also granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss for failing
to state a claim for unseaworthiness, holding that
a vessel cannot have a warranty of seaworthiness
before the sea trial granting its seaworthiness is
complete.

Endnotes
1. 28 U.S.C. 2680(d).
2. Grubert Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock
Co., 513 U.S. 527(1995).
3. 46 U.S.C. 3010(a).
4. Stewart v. Dutra Constr. Co., 543 U.S. 481
(2005).
5. Reynolds v. Ingalls Shipbuilding Div., Litton
Sys., Inc., 788 F.2d 264 (5th Cir. 1986);
Williams v. Avondale shipyards, Inc., 452 F.2d
955 (5th Cir. 1971).
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DOSHA Applies to Jet-Ski
Accident in Bahamian Waters
Mellor v. Moe, 2007 WL 2883784 (S.D. Fla. Sept.
27, 2007).
Sarah Spigener, 3L, University of Mississippi School
of Law
The Southern District Court of Florida has held
that the operators of a 30-foot fishing boat and a
jet-ski were equally at fault for a collision that
fatally injured the driver of the jet-ski. The court
concluded that the Death on the High Seas Act
(DOSHA) applied to the collision since it
occurred in Bahamian waters and awarded damages to the victim’s parents.
Background
The Mellor family took a cruise from Florida to
the Bahamas in August 2003. On the day of the
accident, the family arrived on a beach from an
excursion ferry. While on the beach, Jason
Mellor, his brother John Mellor, and
Shannon Mitchell rented jet-skis.
With Shannon as a passenger on
Jason’s jet-ski, they departed the
beach. At that time, the
weather was turning darker and a
rain storm was
approaching.
Jason and Shannon
briefly stopped
to wipe their
glasses and
when Jason

started driving
again, Shannon saw a boat traveling towards
them. John briefly saw the boat when it was
about 100 feet away and again about 2 to 3 seconds before it collided with Jason’s jet-ski. The
Volume 6, No. 4 The SandBar

driver of the boat testified that he did not see the
jet-skis until impact, but the passenger in the
boat testified he saw the jet-ski a “split-second”
before impact. Jason Mellor was fatally injured
in the collision. His parents brought an action
against the driver of the boat pursuant to
DOSHA to recover damages.
DOSHA Claim
The plaintiffs, Jason’s parents, contended that
the court has jurisdiction pursuant to DOSHA
because the incident occurred on the high seas.
The defendant, the driver of the boat, argued
that the collision occurred in Bahamian waters,
not the high seas, and DOSHA should not apply.
DOSHA does not include a definition of “high
seas” so the court examined prior cases to determine its meaning. In a similar case, the court
held that a negligence action filed by the
estate of a cruise ship passenger who suffered a heart attack while
snorkeling in

Mexican waters
was covered under
DOSHA.1 The court of
appeals, in yet another case, stated that
DOSHA applied when the cause of action arose
within the territorial waters of a foreign country.2 Finally, in a third case, the court of appeals
concluded that DOSHA applied to a death in
the Bahamas. 3 Because the death occurred in
Bahamian waters, the court concluded that
DOSHA applied to this case.
See DOSHA, page 16
Page 15
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In order for the court to apply DOSHA to this
case, the court must first have admiralty jurisdiction. To determine admiralty jurisdiction, the
court must decide whether the cause of action
bears a significant relationship to traditional
maritime activity. The court, in the snorkeling
case mentioned above, concluded that “the significant relationship test was met because the
decedent was a paying passenger aboard a cruise
ship sailing from Florida to Mexico which
arranged maritime recreational activities for its
passengers.” 4 Because the only difference
between the two cases was that the cruise ship
was included as one of the defendants, the court
concluded that the significant relationship test
would also be satisfied in this case thereby giving
the court admiralty jurisdiction.
DOSHA allows the decedent’s parents to
seek a claim for compensation of the pecuniary
loss sustained as a result of the decedent’s death.
In order to apply DOSHA, the court must determine the comparative negligence of the defendant and the decedent. The parties cited two different rules that they claimed should be the controlling standard to determine comparative negligence. The court concluded that the jet-skis did
have the right of way, but according to the
International Regulations for Preventing
Collisions at Sea (COLREGS), should have
taken action to avoid the collision. The court
concluded that the boat and the jet-ski equally
caused the accident; therefore, the decedent’s
comparative negligence is 50 percent.
Next, the court must determine the amount
of damages the plaintiffs should receive.
DOSHA damages are “limited to fair compensation for the pecuniary damages of the
parents of Jason Mellor.”5 The court determined that the services Jason performed,
such as mowing the lawn, shoveling snow,
walking the dogs, and driving his brother various places is compensable. The court determined that these services constituted six
hours of work per week at a rate of $18.50 an
hour. Also, the costs of the decedent’s funeral
and burial arrangements could be compensated. The court awarded damages to the parents for the 26.5 years of their life expectancy
Page 16

plus the cost of the funeral and burial, reduced
by 50 percent for comparative negligence, for a
total of $83,877.08.
Conclusion
The court concluded that the drivers of the boat
and of the jet-ski were equally at fault for the
collision that occurred in Bahamian waters.
The court concluded that it had admiralty jurisdiction for an accident that occurred in foreign
territorial waters. The court determined that
the parents of the decedent were entitled to
compensation for the pecuniary loss of the
decedent’s services and for the funeral and burial arrangements, minus the amount of the
decedent’s comparative negligence.
Endnotes
1. Moyer v. Rederi, 645 F.Supp. 620 (S.D. Fla.
1986).
2. Sanchez v. Loffland Bros. Co., 626 F.2d 1228
(5th Cir. 1980). This case is binding on this
court because the court was part of the Fifth
Circuit until 1981.
3. Ford v. Wooten, 681 F.2d 712, 716 (11th Cir.
1982).
4. Mellor v. Moe, 2007 WL 2883784 at *4 (S.D.
Fla. Sept. 27, 2007); citing, Moyer, 645 F.Supp.
at 624-25.
5. Id. at *6.

Photograph of cruise ship courtesy of ©Nova Development Corp.
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Ski Resort Plan Approval in
Violation of NEPA and NFMA
Oregon Natural Resources Council Fund v.
Goodman, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 22614 (9th Cir.
Sept. 24, 2007).
Terra Bowling, J.D.
The Ninth Circuit has held that the United States
Forest Service (USFS) violated the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and the
National Forest Management Act (NFMA) by not
properly evaluating a proposed expansion of a ski
resort within the Rogue River and Klamath
National Forest. The court also held that the
approval violated the NFMA by not designating
riparian reserves and restricted watershed terrain.
Background
For two decades, the Mount Ashland Association
(MAA) has been exploring the possibility of
expanding the Mount Ashland Ski Area (MASA),
located near Ashland, Oregon. MAA, which leases the area from the city, had planned to expand
MASA and upgrade its facilities, including the
creation of beginner and intermediate ski and
snowboard areas.
NEPA requires government entities to look at
the environmental effects of major federal projects
affecting the environment. Agencies must prepare
an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) that
“provide full and fair discussion of significant environmental impacts and … inform decisionmakers
and the public of the reasonable alternatives which
would avoid or minimize adverse impacts or
enhance the quality of the human environment.1
NFMA requires the USFS to develop “forest
plans” that maintain the fish and wildlife habitat
of area species. The MASA area is subject to two
forest plans, the Rogue River LRMP and the
NWFP. Under the Rogue River Plan, the USFS
must manage and maintain area species, especially sensitive species. The area is home to a sensitive species, the Pacific fisher. The LRMP also
requires the agency to conduct an evaluation of
recreational lands projects.
Volume 6, No. 4 The SandBar

After MAA submitted a plan to the USFS, the
agency prepared a draft Environmental Impact
Statement (EIS), which caused the public and
the Environmental Protection Agency to express
concerns about erosion and sedimentation and
the threat to biodiversity, watershed resources,
and water quality. The USFS then issued a Final
Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS) analyzing six expansion alternatives. A month later, the
NFWS issued a Record of Decision (ROD)
selecting one of the alternatives for the expansion, with some modifications. The plan selected
by the Service proposed several new additions to
MASA: (1) the construction of two new chair lifts
and two new surface lifts; (2) clear cutting seventy-one acres for new ski runs; and (3) the clearing
of four acres for lift corridors and staging areas.
The ROD generated 28 notices of appeal, but the
Service denied all of the appeals.
Several environmental groups filed suit in
federal court seeking declaratory and injunctive
relief under NEPA and NFMA. The groups
claimed that the Forest Service failed to ensure
the viability of the fisher, as well as to adequately consider and disclose the direct and cumulative impacts on the fisher. The groups also
claimed that the agency failed to (3) evaluate
whether the expansion will comply with wetlands laws; (4) adhere to Rogue River LRMP and
NWFP standards and guidelines for protecting
watersheds and riparian areas; (5) disclose the
error rate of the model used to estimate sediment
impacts on the municipal watershed; and (6)
adequately disclose cumulative water quality
impacts by utilizing a flawed computer model.
The United States District Court for the District
of Oregon granted summary judgment in favor of
USFS, but enjoined construction until the Ninth
Circuit ruled on a motion to stay.
The Pacific Fisher
The Ninth Circuit considered whether the district court erred in its decision. The court first
See Ski Resort, page 18
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looked at whether the USFS violated NFMA by
failing to evaluate the effects of the expansion on
the Pacific fisher, a sensitive species. The USFS
had prepared a biological evaluation on the
impact of a MASA expansion on the fisher in
1999; however, the Service did not update the
1999 biological evaluation to reflect the Pacific
fisher’s appearance in the project area two years

Photograph of skier courtesy of ©Nova Development Corp.,
photograph of Pacific fisher courtesy of California Department
of Fish and Game

later. The Ninth Circuit found that the
Service’s habitat evaluation did not meet the
requirements of the LRMP’s evaluation requirement; therefore, the USFS violated NFMA.
Next, the court considered whether the
Service violated NEPA. First, the court found
that the Service failed to analyze the incremental
impact of the actions, including all past, present,
and future projects. The court then noted that
the USFS failed to explain the effect of the proPage 18

ject on a biological corridor between the
Klamath-Siskiyou and Southern Cascades
Regions. Because of these failures, the Service
was also in violation of NEPA.
The Ninth Circuit also ruled that the USFS
violated NFMA by failing to designate riparian
reserves and restricted watersheds, as required
under the Rogue River LRMP and the NWFP.
The riparian reserves and restricted
watersheds are intended to provide
buffer zones in areas prone to mudslides
and other hydrologically important
areas. Because the Service failed to do
this, the court found that the terrain
within the expansion would not be adequately protected.
The court held that the district
court did not err in ruling in favor of
USFS on the remaining claims. The
court found that the USFS provided
adequate analysis in the FEIS regarding these claims. Furthermore, the
court held that the claims regarding
the Pacific fisher were the only ones
warranting injunctive relief, given the
potential for irreparable environmental harm.
Conclusion
Ninth Circuit reversed the district
court, holding that
USFS had violated
the National Environmental Policy Act
and the National
Forest Management
Act by not properly
evaluating the project’s impact on the Pacific fisher. The court
found that the approval also violated the NFMA
by not designating riparian reserves and
restricted watershed terrain. The court granted
injunctive relief and remanded the case to the
district court.
Endnotes
1. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.
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Using Copyrighted Works

By Will Wilkins
In the last article on copyright basics, we looked
at what was required to create a copyrighted
work, who owns that work, and what rights went
along with ownership. We will spend the next
several articles looking in a little more detail at
some of these issues.
Today, we will delve into an issue on which I
spend a great deal of time and energy. When a
copyrighted work is created, the owner of that
work inherits some very strong rights to control
the use of that work. However, unlike with ownership of other personal property (a car, for
instance), the general public is also given some
rights to use the copyrighted work even without
the consent of the owner of the copyright. Using
the car analogy, it would be like someone having
the right to drive your car every Tuesday morning
without asking. Some of these use rights include
the classroom teaching exception, fair use, and
library copying, each of which will be discussed
below.
First, however, let’s look at a way you can use
others’ works without having to rely on the statutory exceptions. It is very simple: permission.
You can use another’s copyrighted work if you
have their permission to do so. Permissions in
the copyright world are generally termed “releases” or “licenses.”
In asking for permission, you should consider the exact parameters of the permission since
there are infinite variables, such as: the number
of times the material may be used, geographic
restrictions to the use, notice requests, and the
manner in which it may be used. As to the manner in which the material may be used, you
could, for instance, limit the use to print or
expand it to include print and electronic media.
Another issue to consider in obtaining permission is documentation. It is very important to

®

document the permission so that both parties are
clear on the terms and scope of the permission,
and the preferred method is through the use of
written agreements such as licenses or releases.
The person requesting the permission will also
need to make sure that the person granting the
permission actually has the power to grant it so
that you are not (to continue the analogy) asking
my neighbor if you can borrow my car.
The law, however, does not require permission before using a copyrighted work at all times.
In fact, there are some fairly major exceptions to
the ownership rights.
One that is not exactly an exception applies
to U.S. Government documents. Works prepared
by an employee of the U.S. Government as part
of his or her job are generally not copyrightable.
Exercise caution in dealing with Government
documents, however, because the work may actually be the work of someone other than a federal
employee or the work may contain within it
copyrighted works. Additionally, be aware that
the U.S. Government can hold trademarks (no
using the presidential seal). So, a little sleuthing
is necessary in using Government works.
Another instance when permission is not
necessary is where the material is not protected
by copyright or is in the “public domain.” Works
may fall into the public domain in several ways.
First, the author may place them there expressly
by stating that the work is in the public domain
and may be freely used. Second, a copyright may
expire and the work is placed in the public
domain. The current copyright term is the life of
the author plus 70 years, but anything published
before 1923 is now in the public domain. Finally,
a work may be in the public domain for failure
to meet a technical requirement of copyright.
For instance, for a period of time (1923-1977),
copyright notice was required when the work
was published and, without notice, the work
See Copyrights, page 20
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would fall into the public domain. In my experience, however, it is very difficult to determine
whether the work was originally published without notice.
The copyright statutes are filled with other
situation-specific exceptions to the owner’s
exclusive rights. For example, 17 U.S.C. 110(1)
provides that in the course of face-to-face teaching activities at non-profit schools, teachers may
perform or display copyrighted works. Other sections allow certain library copying of copyrighted materials.
Finally, the mother of all exceptions is the
“fair use doctrine.” The statute states simply
enough that “the fair use of a copyrighted work .
. . for purposes such as criticism, comment, news
reporting, teaching, . . . scholarship, or research
is not an infringement of copyright.” 1 Unfortunately, the statute continues to define “fair
use” in a less than clear manner. Essentially, for
a use to be fair, it must pass a four-part balancing
test. Each factor is theoretically given equal
weight. The factors include:

• The effect of the use upon the potential
market for or value of the work.2
As you can see, there rarely are times when you
come away from the fair use test thinking that
you have a concrete answer. Many groups have
worked on “guidelines” or “best practices” for
fair use but most fail to grasp the expansive
nature of fair use and seem overly restrictive.
Though many of these exceptions do not
yield definitive answers, make no mistake that
the exceptions and the rights of the public to use
copyrighted works carved out in the statutes are
rights as valid as copyright ownership rights
themselves. In fact, a string of new cases have
confirmed the vitality of the fair use doctrine. In
future articles, we will take a detailed look at
some of these cases as they, perhaps better than
any guidelines, offer guidance on the parameters
of fair use.
Endnotes:
1. 17 U.S.C. 107.
2. Id.

• The purpose and character of the use:
Elements considered here include: Is
the use transformative or for a use
other than originally intended? Is the use commercial
in nature?
• The nature of the
work: Important factors here include: Is
the work unpublished? How much
creativity was involved in the work?
• The amount and
substantiality of the
work used: Questions I
ask with regard to this
factor are: Do you want to
use the whole work? Even if
you’re just using a small portion, are you giving away the
punch line?
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Federal Legislation, 2007
110 Public Law 22 – Animal Fighting Prohibition Enforcement Act of 2007
(H.R. 137)
Imposes a fine and/or prison term of up to three years for violations of the Animal Welfare Act
(AWA). Prohibits sponsoring or exhibiting an animal in an animal fighting venture; buying selling,
transporting, or delivering animals for participation in animal fighting; or, using the mail or other
form of interstate commerce to promote or further animal fighting. Also amends the AWA to prohibit
knowingly selling, buying, transporting, or delivering a knife, a gaffe, or any other sharp instrument
for use in bird fighting.
(S. 277)
110 Public Law 47 – Grand Teton National Park Extension Act of 2007
Modifies the boundaries of Grand Teton National Park to include certain land within the GT Park
Subdivision and for other purposes.
(H.R. 2272)
110 Public Law 69 – America COMPETES Act
Provides an approach for the United States to maintain and improve its technological and scientific
innovation by strengthening scientific research, improving education, and enhancing technological
expertise.
110 Public Law 94 – Pesticide Registration Improvement Renewal Act
(S. 1983)
Amends the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act to renew and amend the provisions
for the enhanced review of covered pesticide products, to authorize fees for certain pesticide products, and to expend and improve the collection of maintenance fees, and for other purposes.
(H.R. 1495)
110 Public Law 114 – Water Resources Development Act of 2007
Reauthorizes the Water Resources Development Act (WRDA), which authorizes projects for navigation, ecosystem or environmental restoration, and hurricane, flood, or storm damage reduction in
Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Florida, Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Maryland, Minnesota, Missouri and Kansas, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Texas, Virginia, and Washington. Terminates specified projects in Florida.
110 Public Law 115 – Recognition of Navy UDT-SEALS Museum
(H.R. 2779)
Recognizes the Navy UDT-SEAL Museum in Fort Pierce, Florida, as the official national museum
of Navy SEALs and their predecessors.
(H.R. 50)
110 Public Law 132 – African Elephant Conservation Act
Amends the African Elephant Conservation Act and the Rhinoceros and Tiger Conservation Act of
1994. The Act authorizes appropriations for fiscal years 2007-2012, increases administrative expense
allowances, and abolishes provisions requiring the Secretary of the Interior to notify countries of
approval of conservation projects for African elephants, rhinoceros, and tigers.
110 Public Law 133 – Asian Elephant Conservation Act
(H.R. 465)
Amends the Asian Elephant Conservation Act and the Rhinoceros and Tiger Conservation Act of
1994. The Act authorizes appropriations for fiscal years 2007-2012, increases administrative expense
allowances, and abolishes provisions requiring the Secretary of the Interior to notify countries of
approval of conservation projects for Asian elephants.
Volume 6, No. 4 The SandBar
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International
Law Update
Australia Anti-Fouling Convention Enacted
On September 17, 2008, the International Convention on the Control of Harmful Anti-Fouling
Systems on Ships, 2001 will enter into force. The convention requires internationally-traveling ships
400 gross tons and above to have an International Anti-Fouling System Certificate. Ships must pass
an inspection to receive the certificate. Ships less than 400 gross tons but 24-meters or longer must
carry a Declaration of Anti-Fouling Systems signed by the shipowner or authorized agent.
Red and Pink Coral Export to Be Regulated
In June, a committee at a United Nations Wildlife Conference voted to begin regulating the export
of red and pink corals. The corals are threatened by over-harvesting, pollution, seabed trawling, and
global warming. The restrictions on international trade should be in effect by the end of 2008.
Australia Signs Kyoto Protocol
In December, Australia signed the Kyoto Protocol. Australia’s new Prime Minister, Kevin Rudd,
signed the agreement just nine days after his election. Australia’s action leaves the United States as
one of the few industrialized nations that has not signed the Protocol.
China and South Korea Agree to Green Desert
Beijing and Seoul have signed an agreement to “green” the Ulan Buh Desert in China. The countries
will spend about $2 million U.S. dollars to grow trees and build greenhouses in the regions. Officials
hope the project will help stop environmental deterioration in the area.
Photograph of olive ridley turtles in Mexico courtesy of NOAA, photographer
Michael P. Jensen

Endangered Turtle Eggs Recovered in Mexico
In October, thousands of endangered turtle
eggs were recovered from smugglers in
Oaxaca, Mexico, during a routine road-block
set up by police. The olive ridley turtles are
listed as an endangered species in the United
States, but the eggs are part of a traditional
diet in the Mexican region of Oaxaca.
Correction: A photograph in The SandBar 6:3 p.14 was incorrectly identified as the USS Missouri
Memorial in Pearl Harbor. The photograph was a picture of the USS Arizona Memorial.
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State and federal officials have plans to eradicate the rats from Rat Island in Alaska. Introduced to
the island in 1780 by a rat-infested ship, the rats feed on seabirds and their eggs and chicks and have
annihilated the bird populations of the island. The
state enacted regulations requiring ships to check for
rats and eradicate them. The state is issuing brochures
to mariners that will explain how to control rats on
ships and prevent them from going ashore. Additionally, biologists will drop rat poison from helicopters onto the island.
Ireland’s only salmon farm has been devastated by
jelly fish. A huge pack of jelly fish – estimated to be 10
square miles and 35 feet deep – descended on the farm
killing 100,000 salmon. Workers tried to save the fish,
Photograph of rat courtesy of National Institute of Health.
but their
boats were unable to reach the pens in time. The jelly
fish, Pelagia nocticula, usually do not travel so far north.
The company hopes to receive emergency aid from the
government.
A Charleston man was rescued for the second time in
three years when his boat was carried into a river by the
tide. When he didn’t return home from a fishing trip, his
wife called authorities. He spent the night shivering in
his boat, while the Coast Guard and local authorities
launched a search. After the rescue, he was treated for
Photograph of jellyfish courtesy of NOAA NMFS AFSC, phodehydration and exposure at a local hospital. In 2004, he
tographers Matt Wilson/Jay Clark.
was rescued after his boat was grounded and he became
trapped in knee-deep mud trying to push the boat out. His wife now requires him to have a friend or
a cell phone with him on his boating expeditions.
In Kansas, a woman was frying fish on the stove when she briefly stepped out of the house to take out
the trash. The family’s dog shut the door behind her. A grease fire erupted and fully engulfed the
house. The dog made it out safely, but the fire caused over $50,000 in damages.
In England, a canoeist disappeared and was presumed drowned in 2002. Recently, the man showed
up in a local police station, claiming that he had suffered amnesia. After some questioning, the police
found that the story was false. He had been hiding, with the help of his wife, at his residence since
his disappearance. The man and his wife have been charged with fraud. Police believe their two sons,
who did not live with the couple, had no knowledge of the hoax.
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